Criminal Law: People vs Punzalan G.R. No. 199892 (Complex Crimes, Avoidance of Greater Evil)

G.R. No. 199892

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.

ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR., Accused-Appellant

FACTS: On August 10, 2002, at around 10:00 in the evening, the accused together with his colleagues went to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they had a drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside "Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"), appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table. To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the NETC camp. 

Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions. Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!” SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel. When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness. When they came to, they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van, but to no avail. 

As a result, SN1 Andal died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head, thorax and abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries to the head and liver. The head and neck injuries were such that a lot of blood vessels were ruptured and the fractures were embedded in the brain. The laceration on the liver, also a mortal injury, was a blunt traumatic injury As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and different parts of the body for which he was confined at the infirmary for about eighteen (18) days; SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his knee and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day; and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his right foot.

ISSUES:

1.WON the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?

2.WON the appellant may invoke the avoidance of greater evil as a justifying circumstance

HELD:

1. YES, The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor,an afflictive penalty.

2. NO, Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a justifying circumstance,the following requisites should be complied with:

(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and

(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even appellant’s own witness who was in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellant’s claim. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil appellant claimed to avoid did not actually exist. This Court agrees.

Moreover, appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken.

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Criminal Law: Paera vs People Case Digest (Plurality of Crimes, Grave Threat, and Defense of Property of Strangers)

G.R. No. 181626. May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner,

vs

PERALTA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Respondent.

FACTS: As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his constituents use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access. The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw! (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo! (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!).
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

ISSUES
1. WON the petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
2. WON the defense of property of stangers applicable


HELD: 

1. YES, we see no reason to extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another and petitioner neither performed a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of consummating another.


2. NO, here is likewise no merit in petitioners claim of having acted to defend and protect the water rights of his constituents in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay. The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal liability of;

"anyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive."

Requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment. None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

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Criminal Law: Masipequina vs CA Case Digest (Self Defense)

G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989

NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners, 

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Paulino G. Clarin for petitioners.

CORTES, J.:

FACTS: On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo and almost hacked her. He always carried a bolo, and had threatened his own wife, daughter, brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing for their safety, they transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the barrio school and left Leopoldo alone in the house of his father. Nicolas Potane and his immediate relatives wanted Leopoldo to be examined and treated by the Provincial Health Officer for his mental ailment.

Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a 38 cal. revolver and the latter with the Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by the sub-station commander to arrest Leopoldo. Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons, among whom was Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane where Leopoldo was. Upon arrival thereat, Pat. Masipequina, a childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and urged him to come out. Leopoldo instead told him to come up. Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax lamp. Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard Although in the yard, Patrolman Alampayan could see what was going on inside the house because it was a single storey house and had an elevation of only 4 feet. Nicolas stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose. As the latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of his face. At this juncture, Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three shots. One shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for help. Leopoldo ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on the ground. In the process he hit his shin on a piece of stone. Leopoldo also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh. Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health center for treatment.

ISSUE: WON, given the undisputed facts, petitioner Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense.

HELD: YES, n the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to quell a disturbance shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him with a knife, the Court laid down the following rule:

"A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might, perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman's club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle.”

Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina in repelling the attack were, under the circumstances, both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the rocking chair toward Leopoldo Potane but when that proved futile and he (Masipequina) was caught in a very precarious position, i.e., his back was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other choice but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. Under the circumstances, there was no opportunity for Masipequina to carefully take aim. He just discharged his weapon at the deceased in the hope that such would save him from any further injury or death.

It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused [U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907)]. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries does not necessarily imply that the means he used to repel the attack were unreasonable and excessive. The fact remains that the act of Leopoldo Potane of attacking Masipequina with a bolo was a very real danger to his life that the latter had to repel the best way he can. That the gunshot wounds he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less reasonable under the circumstances.

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Criminal Law: People vs Gutual Case Digest (Self Defense, Defense of Strangers or Relatives)

G.R. No. 115233. February 22, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs. 

WILSON GUTUAL y REMOLLENA and JOAQUIN NADERA y APOSTOL, accused. 

WILSON GUTUAL y REMOLLENA, accused-appellant.

Facts: The accused are members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Unit (CAFGU) in the Municipality of San Vicente, Davao. On 29 December 1990, at around 1:30 p.m.,The defense claims that the killing was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative or stranger. It tried to prove that on the aforementioned date and time, the victim was running amuck or berserk, chasing Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual in front of the latters house. Drawn by shouts for help from onlookers, accused Gutual and Nadera rushed to the scene, with Gutual firing warning shots into the air. Maglinte stopped pursuing the barangay captain, turned towards the accused, then started approaching them. Although Gutual continued to fire warning shots, Maglinte kept walking towards him, while Gutual kept retreating to put some distance between him and the victim. The two moved some ten meters, crossed the road in front of the barangay captains house, and ended up near the barangay hall. Finally, Gutual was pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. Maglinte was now about one to three meters from Gutual and pressing on, unceasingly hacking away at Gutual, who, however, managed to evade the blows. Nadera fired warning shots into the air, but Maglinte continued his attack. Gutual then fired at the victims hand to disarm him, but unfortunately the bullet pierced Maglintes bolo-wielding arm, went through his chest, and came out his back.

Issues: 

1. WON Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved defense of a relative or of a stranger
2. WON Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved self-defense 

Held: 

1. NO, As correctly posited by the Appellee, the defense of a relative or a stranger is unavailing in this case. The accused-appellant shot the victim while the latter, after having stopped chasing the barangay captain, was approaching the former. At that instance then, the barangay captains life was no longer in danger as the accused-appellant admitted. Clearly then, what might have been unlawful aggression on the part of the victim against the barangay captain had ceased, and there was nothing more to prevent or repel. Hence, the second requisite of the defense of a relative or a stranger under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, cannot be present.

2. YES, The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It was sufficiently established that the unlawful aggression came from the victim. Indeed, since he was running amuck, he did not care anymore whom to attack or whether the person to be attacked was unarmed or armed with a high-powered rifle. 

Significantly, the entry in the Death Certificate corroborates the theory of the defense that the victim was in the act of hacking the accused-appellant when the latter shot deceased's right hand for the purpose only of throwing the bolo out of his hand, but the bullet pierced through and hit the deceased's breast. There can be, as well, no doubt in the mind of the Court that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused-appellant. Whether the means employed by the accused-appellant were reasonable depends on the circumstances of this case.

Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the latter. The danger to the accused-appellants life was clearly imminent. It would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural than to use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense.

 It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury

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Criminal Law: People v Manlulu Case Digest (Self Defense, Conspiracy and Illegal Arrest, Searches and Seizures)

G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON, accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: In the evening of 29 May 1986, he and accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu were having a drinking spree in an alley along Quirino Avenue, Paco, Manila. They were later joined by Agent Gerardo Alfaro who had a .45 cal. pistol tucked to his waist. When Alfaro arrived he blurted out, "Dito may kumakatalo sa aking tao."  At twelve o'clock midnight, the group transferred in front of the house of Manlapaz and continued to drink. There Samson suddenly stabbed Alfaro in the chest with a 6-inch double-bladed knife while boasting, "Dapat sa iyo manahimik na." Alfaro at this time was "somewhat bent because he was already drunk."  Manlulu then followed suit and stabbed Alfaro in the abdomen several times with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson grabbed the .45 cal. service pistol of Alfaro and shot him in the neck. When Alfaro slumped on the pavement, both accused fled, with Samson holding Alfaro's handgun. After a few seconds, both accused returned and got Alfaro's wristwatch and wallet.

Both accused invoke self- defense. According to Samson, while they were drinking, and after taking ekis pinoy, Alfaro said he had a "prospect" and invited them to go with him. Thinking that "prospect" meant they were going to rob somebody, Samson excused himself by saying that he had just been released from prison, and had yet to fetch his wife. Alfaro, apparently resenting Samson's unwillingness to join them, drew his gun and pointed it to Samson who parried it saying: "Pare, wala tayong biruan ng ganyan. Baka pumutok iyan." But Alfaro repeatedly pointed the gun to him. Every time he did, Samson would push the gun aside. Fearful that it might go off, he held the gun and tried to ward it off, resulting in a struggle for its possession. He got hold of the ice pick on top of the drum and stabbed Alfaro instinctively. Manlapaz tried to separate them; as a consequence, Samson dropped the ice pick. As Samson and Alfaro continued to wrestle for the possession of the gun, they fell on the ground and the gun accidentally went off hitting Alfaro in the neck. Rattled, Samson immediately fled. 

They also insist that the non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained. Patrolman Perez however admitted on cross- examination that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well as the wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused of the latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at that time Manlulu was under the influence of liquor.

The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro. 

ISSUES:

1. WON there was self defense
2. WON there exists a conspiracy
3. WON the arrest was made illegally

HELD:

1. NO, The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For self- defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger which forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefore reasonable means to resist said attack.

Here, at the outset, the two accused have already failed to show that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more, is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 

Even the means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not reasonable. For, even if we disregard the gunshot wound which Samson claims to have resulted from an accidental firing, the victim also suffered seven other stab wounds, three of which were fatal, one of which was admittedly inflicted by Samson, while the other two, by accused Manlulu. Definitely, it was not necessary to stab, more so repeatedly, the victim. Considering their relative positions as they drank - each within the other's reach — all that was necessary was for the two accused to band together and overpower the lone victim with their bare hands, assuming the deceased was indeed pointing his gun at one of them. A stab wound may not necessarily be fatal and thus enable the victim to fire his gun. But a firm grasp by the two accused of the victim's arm holding the gun, or of the gun itself, could prevent the victim from shooting them. At any rate, the number of wounds suffered by Alfaro indicates a determined effort of both accused to kill the victim, which negates self- defense. 

2. NO, There was no conspiracy likewise in the killing of Alfaro. Settled is the rule that neither joint nor simultaneous actionper se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy. The evidence shows that it was the victim who chanced upon Manlapaz and the two accused drinking, and decided to join them. Accused Manlulu was not even armed when he went to the drinking spree. We have often said that conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the prosecution failed to show that Manlulu and Samson conspired to kill Alfaro. There being no conspiracy, each is liable for his own acts.

3. YES, The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the police authorities should have first obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later. This is not any different from People v. Cendana  where the accused was arrested one day after the killing of the victim, and only on the basis of information obtained by the police officers. There we said that the "circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest."

FULL TEXT HERE

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